Reaching Past the Low Hanging Fruit

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Overview

- Detecting new attacks
  - sequence-based
  - StackGuard
  - specification-based
- Forensics
  - Need to understand what may or may not be an attack
  - Correlation: finding and understanding the subtle data
- Scaling
  - thousands of signatures
  - larger, more distributed attacks
  - Reduction through integration
- Accelerating the tempo

Detecting New Attacks

- Generally easier from the host (opinion!)
- Generic signatures
  - illegal transition to root
- Sequence-based detection
  - Profiling programs, not people
- StackGuard
- Specification-based detection
- Forensics, data mining, discovery

Sequence-based ID



- Profile a **program**
- Profile based on model of execution path
  - sequences of system calls **learned**
- University of New Mexico
  - http://www.cs.unm.edu/~immsec/html-misc/ids.html
- Reliable Software Technologies
  - aghosg@rstcorp.com

StackGuard



- Many of today's attacks involve buffer overflow
  - Overflow buffer, insert code, reset return address
- StackGuard places a canary between buffers and return address pointers
  - Overflow will corrupt canary
  - Overflow is detected, reported, halted
- http://www.cse.ogi.edu/DISC/projects/immunix/StackGuard/

Specification-based ID



- Define/specify what a **program** should do
  - focus on network and privileged programs
- Detect programs exceeding their specification
- Approach is being incorporated into wrappers (FreeBSD, NT, Solaris)
- Publications:
  - http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/papers/pdfs/ck-mr-kl-97.pdf
  - http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/~ko/papers/thesis.pdf

Forensics: Understanding and Discovering Attacks

- Mistakes to prime your thinking
  - The FTP Sweep
  - 10 million connection DOS
  - Sendmail's mysterious QUIT
  - Warez that wasn't
- Correlation
  - Finding related activity
  - Beyond random attacks: is the semiconductor industry under attack?

QUIT vs. QUIT





I QUIT yes

QUIT yes

I QUIT NO

QUIT yes

Warez Attack?

```
------------------------------------------------------------
2531844  170.236.61.27  --> 167.103.221.216 (1404 -> 21)
from: 19:02:47 ( 7/23/1998)  to: 19:17:38 ( 7/23/1998)
client flags: SA R    server_flags: SA
        ---- FTP -------------------------------------
        USER: anonymous
        PASS: xxxxxxxxx
        RETR: /!!!__µå_Ã À__î°¸_Å_ß ÇÕ´Ï´Ù!!!.txt
              /Mpeg-°¡¿ä/[ÀÌ_ÂÈ ] ÃµÀÏµ¿_È MV-by ego.MPG
        CWD:  /
              /Mpeg-°¡¿ä/
        FAILURES: 0

------------------------------------------------------------
2529427  170.236.61.27  -->  203.29.143.17  (1402 -> 80)
from: 19:01:36 ( 7/23/1998)  to: 19:01:38 ( 7/23/1998)
client flags: SAF     server_flags: SAF
------------------------------------------------------------
```

http://www.shinbiro.com/home.html

Non-ASCII Character Sets



Themescape

- Themescape discovers clusters of related data sources
- NSA applied similar tools (parentage/acquaintance) to session data from a large DOD break-in
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing visualization tools



http://demo.cartia.com

http://multimedia.pnl.gov:2080/infoviz/index.html

Tens of Thousands of Signatures



TechWeb® The Technology News Site

Technology News

New Viruses Send Data Over Internet

(02/05/99, 7:51 p.m. ET)
By Andy Patrizio, TechWeb

PC users used to worry about some viruses wiping out their hard disks. Now, they can fret about other viruses sending their most important data files to points unknown on the Internet without them ever knowing it.

The Caligula virus is the latest in information-stealing viruses popping up in recent months that are increasingly complex and send personal data to a specific location on the Internet.

Scaling Through Signature Compression



- Moving from a few tens of signatures to a tens of thousands of signatures
- If the signature can be represented by a regular expression or finite state machine, you can use cross-products to merge signatures

Merged Signatures

	a	b
0	2	1
1	2	$0/m_2$
2	$0/m_1$	1



Hello X World Signature



The Changing Threat Model



- The original vision of the intruder
- Someone establishes a presence in your system
- Umbilical cord back to the original intruder
- Cuckoo's egg model
- trace back, hack back, thumbprint back

Distributed Attacks

- Smurf Attacks
- Distributed Coordinated Attacks
  - WWW attacks
  - Mailing lists
- Who do you block?
- How do you find the source?





http://all.net/books/dca/top.html

The Agent War

10,000 sources

10,000 targets

Intelligent Agents as
a Force Multiplier



Scaling Through Attack Reduction



- Intrusion detection used to be called "audit reduction"
- Today, even the number of obvious attacks can be overwhelming
- Need to reduce to the important attacks

Expanding the Picture



Scaling Through Integration



Timeline


Discovery
MIDAS
NIDES
New DOD funding
W&S
RealSecure
Nadir
DIDS
Intruder
Alert
Haystack
ISOA
NetRanger
NFR
Stalker
1980
85
1990
93
95
2000
IDES
starts
RTM
paper
Cliff Stoll
Discover
Denning
paper
JP Anderson
paper
Cliff Stoll
Publicizes
NSM
String
matching
Internet
Worm
Gulf
War
Snapp's
thesis
DIDS
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IDES
ends
Mitnick
attack
WheelGroup
founded
RealSecure
TIS/NAI
Cisco
IPOs

Revolutions in Military Affairs



OODA Loops: Time & Command

Civil War
Observe: Dispatch
Orient: Days
Decide: Weeks
Act: Months

World War II
Observe: Radio/wire
Orient: Hours
Decide: Days
Act: Weeks

Gulf War
Observe: Near real
Orient: Minutes
Decide: Hours
Act: Days

Tomorrow
Observe: Real time
Orient: Continuous
Decide: Immediate
Act: Hours

Information Pillar

Information has been one of the pillars of our national strategy...

Now it is the dominant feature

VADM Cebrowski, J6

Summary

- We've made tremendous advancement in detecting intruders, but there are still many challenges.
  - Detecting new/original attacks
  - Understanding attacks
  - Scaling for asymmetric warfare
    - size & number of attacks
    - accelerating the OODA loops
- The war is coming, the clock is ticking