TrendCenter: Accelerating SANS GIAC

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Outline

- Introduction
- Sensor Grid
- Communication & Representation
- Analysis
- Interpretation
- Examples
- Conclusions

Introduction


- This presentation covers work performed under TrendCenter, an AFRL Phase I SBIR, and our tech-transition plans with SANS Global Incident Analysis Center (GIAC).
- TrendCenter was conceived as a disease surveillance system for the Internet.

Surveillance

Surveillance is the *ongoing systematic* collection, collation, analysis and interpretation of data; and the dissemination of information to those who need to know in order that action may be taken.

Principles of Disease Surveillance
World Health Organization
http://www.who.int/emc/slideshows/Survintro/sld001.htm

The Process



Sensor Grid

- Initially focus on installed sensor base
- Early sensor targets include:
 - free IDSs (e.g., Snort)
 - market leading network IDSs
 - firewall logs
 - syslog, virus logs, host-based IDS logs later
- Our data/analysis improves existing sensors
- Opens door for more sophisticated sensors

Communication and Representation

- Moving data to site to be analyzed
 - HTTP used to upload data
 - IETF IDWG IAP under development
 - daily or continuous reporting?
- Aggregating and sanitizing of data
 - if a site has 64,000 addresses scanned, do we include a record for each incident?
- Database Representation
 - similar in difficulty to message representation by IDWG and CIDF before them

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 - automated analysis
 - intrusion detection paradox
 - prediction
 - amazon model
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Automated Analysis

- Simple
 - top scanned ports
 - trend analysis
 - correlating attackers
- Predictions
 - what attacks are you most likely to see?
- Data Mining
 - structures in the data
 - human interpretation required

Intrusion Detection Paradox

- Most sensors today are only useful for detecting already known attacks with existing solutions.
 - Wouldn't it be better to simply apply the solution?
- Would the vast majority of administrators know what to do if a sensor reports a previously unknown attack against a previously unknown vulnerability?
 - It is hard enough to get people to use "Live Update"
 - Is there a commercial market for such sensors?

Detection to Prediction


- Use sensors to predict the attacks before they occur
- Requires shared, correlated reporting
- Amazon model
 - Amazon has millions of books, but they have a very limited opportunity to present to you books they think you will buy.
 - There are hundreds or thousands of vulnerabilities at any site, but a system administrator has time to fix a small number.


Prediction Requires a Community

- A single site by itself only knows what has already attacked it.
- It cannot have foresight.

And part of a community

When part of a community sharing information, a site can predict what attacks it will probably see.





Amazon Techniques

- Top sellers
- Movers and Shakers
- Top sellers unique to your defined group
- Books purchased by those who look the most like you

Amazon Top Sellers

- Simple ranking of the biggest sellers
- Also broken down by topic area
- Our model: most detected attacks/probes
 - epidemic proportions
 - much of it launched by "script kiddies"
 - first rough cut as to what problems need to be fixed
 - could be broken down by OS or application
 - formalized "top threats"
 - eventually look for top anomalies

Amazon Movers & Shakers

- Biggest gainer in sales rank in the past 24 hours
- Possible future best sellers
- Our model: Rising threats
 - which vulnerabilities are most likely to be exploited
 - which exploits are most likely to become epidemics
 - I time permitting, you might want to fix these problems

What Are Movers & Shakers?


The biggest gainers in Amazon.com sales rank over the past 24 hours. Learn more

Movers & Shakers

- **1** 718%
- Boomer Babes by Linda Stasi, Rosemary Rogers
- ★ 529%
- Gold
 - ∼ Abba
- **★** 562%
- Gone in 60 Seconds
 - ~ Nicolas Cage
- 1,036%
- The Powerpuff Girls
 Small Plush Doll (Shiny
 Dress)
 - by Trendmasters
- See all the <u>Movers</u>
 Shakers

Amazon Purchase Circles

- Identifies top sellers unique to defined groups.
- Groups are defined a priori
- Our model:
 - may indicate an attack targeted at a specific group (e.g., Air Force or power grid)



Unique to U.S. Air Force



Books: Unique to U.S. Air Force

More:



- 1 Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal
- 2 They Also Flew: The Enlisted Pilot Legacy, 1912-1942
- 3 Victor Padrini: A Novel of the United States Air Force Academy
- 4 The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam

These books are important to people in the Air Force. What attacks might be unique to the Air Force, and should we pay closer attention to them?

Unique to U.S. Navy



Books: Unique to U.S. Navy

More:

- 1 Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000
- 2 Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001
- 3 The Naval Institute Guide to Naval Writing
- 4 Naval Operations Analysis

Bestsellers for U.S. Air Force



Books: Bestsellers for U.S. Air Force

More:

- 1 Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire
- 2 Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets
- 3 Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone
- 4 Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban

Activity unique to Air Force, and perhaps most important to the Air Force, is lost in the noise.

Amazon Recommendations

- 1 Web Navigation: Designing the User Experience
- 2 Data Mining Solutions: Methods and Tools for Solving Real-World Problems
- 3 Information Architects
- 4 The Code Book: The Evolution of Secrecy from Mary Queen of Scots to Quantum Cryptography
- 5 Data Mining Your Website

Based on similar buyers. Our model? Look for similar victims.

Human Interpretation

- Even today's sensors are capable of detecting new and subtle threats, but few can understand what is being detected.
- Structures found within large amounts of distributed data will need to be interpreted.
- Too many operating systems, applications, protocols, and programming languages.
 - No single organization can field the expertise to diagnose all potential new threats.

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 - portal/community
 - data submission & instant value
 - top threats & subtle threats
 - need for community
- Conclusions



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Automated GIAC Prototype



Overview

<u>Home</u>

GIAC

SANS


Net Squared, Inc.

Submit Report

Events

Resources

Featured Book



Stephen Northcutt, SANS instuctor extraordinaire, updates his classic book on GIAC's Threat Level



Welcome to SANS GIAC prototype for automated event reporting and analysis. If you have had an incident, please Submit a Report

Security News From The Net

- · Any port is a hacker storm, NWFusion
- · Senate panel presses FBI on Carnivore, ZDNet
- <u>'Romeo and Juliet' Virus Strikes MS Outlook</u>, TechTV
- Nothing Romantic About New Romeo & Juliet Virus - GFI, NewsBytes
- Romeo and Juliet virus could end in PC tragedy, Silicon.com
- Denial of Service Attacks Planned For Christmas, ComputerUser

Popular Readings in Computer Security

- Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, Bruce Schneier
- 2. Building Internet Firewalls, Elizabeth D. Zwicky

Top Threats

Top Ports

- 1. 515 Print Spool
- 2. **21** FTP
- 3. **109** POP-2
- 510 Unknown
- 21121 Unknown

More.

Low and Slow

- 1. 6699 Napster
- 2. **20** FTP Data
- 3. **6688** Napster
- 4. **8311** Unknown
- 5. **4922** Unknown

On The Rise

- 1. 6972 Unknown
- 2. **6973** Unknown
- 3. **6974** Unknown
- 4. **100** Unknown









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GIAC Incident Information Data Entry





Welcome To SANS GIAC's incident information center. We accept attack reports from around the Internet, perform basic trend analysis and correlation to spot attack patterns that may be to subtle to detect from a single site. We also support an army of analysts to interpret new and interesting attack patterns.


Your data can go a long way to making the Internet as a whole a much safer place in which to work, shop, and play, so we encourage you to notify us whenever your system or site is probed. In return for your data, we will perform instant analysis on it and providing you with immediate feedback.

Currently we are only accepting reports of probes to specific port and if available, snort scan or alert report files. The information in the latter data is much richer, and so whenever possible, we encourage you to post this data.

- <u>Probe Report.</u> Has a attacker probed your system? If so, enter your information here.
- Snort Reports. Do you have Snort attack or scan logs? Is so, upload the log files here.









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Top Probed Ports



	R	Previous Month				
Rank	Port	Score	Targets	Rank	Score	
1	515	100	59672	9	1.39304	
2	21	43.4006	25898	1	100	
3	109	3.6399	2172	new	new	
4	27374	3.21759	1920	2	58.9977	
5	510	0.517831	309	new	new	
6	21121	0.286567	171	new	new	
7	6970	0.189369	113	new	new	
8	100	0.184341	110	new	new	
9	6972	0.167583	100	new	new	
10	6976	0.142445	85	new	new	
11	6974	0.14077	84	new	new	
12	23	0.110605	66	5	5.65481	
13	6699	0.0754123	45	12	0.546986	
14	6971	0.0553023	33	new	new	
15	6977	0.0519507	31	new	new	
16	31337	0.0502748	30	7	1.93806	







ଌ ີ່ງ Done



Each probe consists of only one packet to one target.


Internet


L	Address 🛃 http://www.netsq.com/GIAC/slow6688.php3			one packet to one targe				
				-				
	Date	Source	Dst Port	Probe Type	Count			
	2000-09-30	24.113.198.51	6688	2*SF**A*	1			
	2000-09-30	24.22.255.16	6688	21SF****	1			
	2000-09-30	65.33.16.3	6688	****	1			
	2000-09-30	65.33.16.3	6688	21*FR*AU	1			
	2000-10-01	129.93.198.104	6688	*1S**P**	1			
	2000-10-01	195.132.25.237	6688	**S**P*U	1			
	2000-10-01	204.126.150 4	6688	21SF****	1			
	2000-10-01	24.201.107.159	6688	2**************************************	1			
	2400_10_02	211.108.230.134	6688	*1**R*AU	1			
There is a small but steady 1-3 probes per day from many different IP		24.112.44.237	6688	21*FRPAU	1			
		195.132.36.195	6688	***F*P**	1			
		24.92.215.107	6688	****RP*U	1			
		200.241.102.70	6688	2*SFRPA*	1			
		205.143.221.235	66 T.C.	P flag settin				
		205.143.223.65	66 I C I	rag setting	gs are			
addresses.		157.182.33.208	66 clea	66 clear indications these				
	2000-10-06	200.52.51.139	66	66				
	2000-10-07	129.2.150.96	66 are	are indeed probes.				
	2000-10-08	129.93.209.218	6688	21***P*U	1			
	2000-10-08	195.132.148.29	6688	*1SF*PA*	1	Ţ		

Mystery of the 6688 Probe

- Why are people (or a single person?) probing 6688?
 - Is there an unknown vulnerability?
 - Is the music industry secretly determining who is using Napster?
- Why are they probing it at such a low level?
- Are these single probes from many sources part of a coordinated activity?

No one organization can field the depth of expertise or the range of sensors needed to fully understand everything that may occur on their systems. A community effort is needed.





Conclusions

- We have been building a disease surveillance system under a Phase I SBIR.
- Creating an integrated sensor grid greatly enhances the value of the sensors.
 - Detect subtle attacks
 - Moves us from detection & reaction to prediction & preparation
- Operational prototype has already demonstrated the plausibility and value of this approach.